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Plato's Cave Revisited: The Epistemology
of Perception in Contemporary
Defamation Law
Randall P. Bezanson*
Kathryn L. Ingle**
You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange
prisoners.
Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own
shadows, or the shadows of one another ....
I.

Introduction

Plato's allegory of the cave continues to provoke thought in
those who wish to establish criteria for making claims of truth or
knowledge. Using the underground den as a metaphor for human
existence, Plato portrays its inhabitants as constrained creatures who
are convinced that the shadows they perceive represent the reality of
the objects which cast them. Those who would know the truth must
venture from the cave, and endure the painful realization that what
had been their "truth" was nothing but an elaborate illusion. The
philosopher cautions those who have embraced the light of dazzling
realities, and who would now confront the cave dwellers with the
illusory nature of their everyday pantomime. Educating the ignorant
may be a perilous enterprise, he says, because patterns of perception
resist external modification, and acquire an authority which organizes human experience.
Contemporary defamation has acquired a cast of pantomime.
Theoretically designed to protect an interest in reputation, current
legal approaches mask the relational aspect of the tort, the aspect
necessary to make sense of the very notion of reputation. By definition, reputation entails the evaluative interpretation of information
concerning an individual or entity by a relevant discourse commu* Professor of Law, The University of Iowa; B.S.B.A. 1968, Northwestern University;
J.D. 1971, University of Iowa.
** Third-year doctoral student, Department of Communications, Broadcasting and Film
Division, The University of Iowa.
I. Plato, The Republic 278-81 (1955).

nity. Reputations are established not because of a speaker's motive
or the specific content of a media message, but because these and
other elements of the communication process have been interpreted
and assimilated by those for whom that motive or message has salience. Consequently, reputational harm represents the likelihood that
a particular communication will tend to prejudice an individual or
entity in the eyes of a significant community.2
Common law defamation has demonstrated sensitivity to the audience's construction of allegedly damaging communication. This is
manifested in many aspects of the common law tort, notable among
them being that falsity - a content oriented question - need not be
proved by the plaintiff, and indeed is not theoretically necessary to
the cause of action.3 Instead, truth is a defense, and operates not to
extinguish the defamation, but to justify it. Notable also is the requirement of proving publication and the concomitant burden of
showing that the community in which publication occurred, in fact,
deemed the statement, or interpreted it, to be sufficiently authoritative and disparaging to warrant their lowered esteem for the plaintiff.4 It is here that the common law dealt with many of the current
problems now addressed through constitutional privileges for "opinion," a concept better approached as an element of interpretation
and response by the audience than as a definable species of statement. Finally, the common law's sensitivity to audience interpretation is reflected in the rule of strict liability: what is important is
whether the plaintiff was injured, not how, or why the injury
occurred.
In contrast, constitutionalization of the tort has led to a compartmentalization of the dynamic processes of human interaction.
The actual malice standard, for instance, focuses attention on the
knowledge or intent of a publisher at the time of publication. The
concern with truth or falsity has given the text or words a life of
their own, equating the context of words with their contextual interpretation. The requirement that fault be proven in virtually every
defamation case has required courts to focus on the speaker or publisher at the point in time of publication, judging liability necessarily
2. See PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 774 (5th ed. 1984).
3. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 797-99 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
W. PROSSER]; SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS 40, 129-42 (1980).
4. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 761; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 163
comment e (1976). The common law often presumed reputation harm, as well as damage, but
the underlying theory was still one of reputational disparagement through the audience's reaction. For an illuminating and provocative criticism of the various presumptions concerning
reputational disparagement and harm, which concludes as we do that the role of the audience
is inadequately addressed even at common law, see ANDERSON, Reputation, Compensation,
and Proof. 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 747 (1984).

in terms of the text, or content, of the allegedly defamatory statement from the vantage point of the publisher's state of mind and
motive.
When these text and publisher oriented perspectives are combined with myths about the unbridled power of media representation, constitutional privilege analysis tends to obscure the role of
readers, viewers, and listeners in the communication process, a role
at least as important to the formation of reputation as what is
meant, or what is said. 5 The lesson of Plato's Cave pertains to defa-

mation law in two distinct but interrelated ways. First, the basic
reputational and relational character of the tort requires that its adjudication focus on the interpreter of the message, not secondarily or

even primarily on the publisher or sender. Second, in focusing on the
questions of truth and falsity and the publisher's state of mind,

courts are looking at the shadows and treating them as reality, although they may, in fact, be an elaborate illusion. This essay will
explore these issues in light of what is known about the dynamic

communication process, using as illustration the recent product disparagement litigation in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc.'
II. Communication Analysis in the Mass Media Setting
The crucial role of perceivers has long been acknowledged

within disciplines whose subject matter consists of expressive and
communicative material. Audiences play active parts in message and

meaning construction, so it is not unexpected for this activity to generate substantial amounts of intra and interdisciplinary scholarship.
The human sciences, such as literary theory and criticism, 7 perceptual and cognitive psychology,8 the philosophy of language, 9 herme5. Certainly, defamation involves theories of representation and meaning as well as
communication. The claim made here is not that these matters are of secondary importance,
but rather that such investigations must be made within an analytical framework cognizant of
an element of communication process which has been repeatedly disenfranchised; that is, the
audience and the perceptual and conceptual processes within individual audience members
that structure the theories of representation and or meaning which should be applied to a given
situation.
6. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249 (D.
Mass 1981) [hereinafter cited as Bose I]; Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 529 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Bose Il]; Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Bose III],
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Bose IV].
7. See BENNETT, Texts, Readers, Reading Formations, 16 Bull. of the Midwest Mod.
Language A. 3-17 (1983); DIGEROLAMO, A CRITICAL THEORY OF LITERATURE 35-43, 87-96
(1981); U. Eco, THE ROLE OF THE READER 3-43, 47-89, 125-172, 175-199 (1979); HOLUB,
RECEPTION THEORY (1984).
8. An extensive array of research into the processes of perception and their relation to
representation exists. Specialized areas, such as psychoacoustics, psycholinguistics, neurop-

neutics, 10 semiotics, 1 and rhetorical theory, 2 all show a sustained
and vigorous interest in the interpreter as participant in any and all
communication. It is no longer feasible to consider audiences as un-

wary receptacles for prepackaged messages.
The notion of the active reader pervades communications-related scholarship. In many ways, the interpretive role of the audience
has also been an important and common sense element of the defamation tort, which focused on reputation in the community rather
than truth or falsity of the words, and which treated the publisher's
purpose or intention as generally irrelevant to the presence of a defamation.' 3 Yet with a few exceptions, the interpretive role of the audi-

ence remains curiously absent from the legal system's approach to
problems of mass communication, a substantive area in which
sychology, and neurolinguistics, to name but a few, study the structures and structuring of
mental activity - memory, imagery, and "thought" in general - using complex scientific and
statistical methodologies. Perhaps the most relevant body of research applicable to the present
analysis emerges from cognitive psychology. See BISIACH & LUZZATTI, Unilateral Neglect of
RepresentationalSpace, 14 CORTEX 129 (1978) (concluding that mental images resemble representations formed during perception of the same kind); KOSSLYN, The Medium and the Message in Mental Imagery: A Theory, 88 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 46 (1981) (claiming that images
depict information, occur within a mental medium, and bear a nonarbitrary correspondence to
the object of thing being represented); KOSSLYN & POMERANTZ, Imagery, Propositions, and
the Form of Internal Representations,9 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 52 (1977) (concluding that
mental imagery is a structurally and functionally distinct form of internal representation);
NEISSER. COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, 173-276 (1966); NEISSER, On the Trail of the Tape-Recorder Fallacy, IISOCIAL ACTION AND THE LAW 35-39 (1985) (arguing that memory is more
than a mere copying of perceived stimuli); SEGAL & FUSELLA, Influence of Imaged Pictures
and Sounds on Detection of Visual and Auditory Signals, J. OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY 459464 (1970) (concluding that mental images, whether visual or auditory, selectively interfere
with perception); SHEPARD, The Mental Image, 33 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 125 (1978)
(concluding that mental imagery is capable of substituting for actual perception, and that
subjects who imagine objects are uniquely fast and accurate in responding discriminately to
related external stimuli); SHEPARD & PODGORNY, Cognitive Processes that Resemble Perceptual Processes. HANDBOOK OF LEARNING AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES 189 (ESTES ed. 1978)
(comparing the effect of symbolic versus nonsymbolic stimuli in constraining internal representational processes vis a vis external objects).
9. See AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH,
AND LOGIC (1936); SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

(1970); WITTGENTSEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (3rd ed. 1958). See also MOORE,
The Semantics of Judging 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151 (1981) (applying theories of meaning to
various theories of adjudication).
10. See GADMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1982). Hermeneutics is also known as the
science of textual interpretation.
II. See BARTHES. ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY (1964); ECo, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS

(1976) [hereinafter cited as Eco] Semiotics is known as the science of signs, and originated
out of structural linguistics and the philosophy of language.
12. See LYNE Rhetorics of Inquiry, 71 Q.J. OF SPEECH 65 (1985); SIMONS, Chronicle
and Critique of a Conference, 71 QJS 52 (1985). These articles discuss the proceedings of the
University of Iowa conference entitled "The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences," held from
March 28-31, 1984. Scholars from diverse fields challenged "objectivist orthodoxies" within
the human sciences, examined the criteria by which particular disciplines make claims of truth
and knowledge, and portrayed all scientific activity as audience and context-bound.
13. Publisher purpose is, of course, often relevant in the determination of common law
privilege. See SACK, supra note 3; W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 771-72, 830-32; MORRIS,
MODERN DEFAMATION LAW 1-4, 29-51 (1978).

human interpretative activity is inadequately theorized.
Media artifacts have intrigued humanity in every epoch, but attract special attention in the modern milieu of mass media. Scholars
and researchers in virtually every discipline have pondered the impact of mass communication upon individuals and societies alike.
The power of the media to construct or reconstruct reality, to influence behavior, and to inform us concerning every conceivable issue is
undeniable. Reputations of nations, governments, corporations, consumer products, and private citizens may be described, distorted, or
destroyed in a few printed paragraphs, a 60 Minutes broadcast, or
an off color photographic layout.
Legal remedies have existed historically to provide compensation for reputational injury resulting from defamatory material, regardless of its mode of presentation. Mass media posed special
problems for the development of legal doctrine. In times when few
citizens enjoyed literacy, the authority, longevity, and potentially
wide distribution of print media encouraged a more severe response
to defamatory statements disseminated through print. Libel was distinguished from slander, an oral transmission of harmful statements,
by attaching criminal liability. The perceived severity of the injury
was reflected in the severity of the sanction.14 As the print media
became institutionalized and were joined by more pervasive communications technologies, the law of defamation demanded progressively more complex and often confusing approaches to legal redress
for media malpractice.
Unfortunately, the desire to encourage rigorous yet responsible
media activity frequently clashes with proprietary interests in reputation. In negotiating a doctrinal path through these competing interests, American courts sometimes lose sight of the big picture, i.e.,
the communication process and its elements, each of which contains
its own peculiar phenomenology. What a publisher knows or could
be expected to know can be determined only with difficulty. What a
specific word or phrase means varies with the context and custom of
relevant interpretive communities. The relationship between what a
speaker intends and what a listener hears remains a subject for
scholarly inquiry. Any attempt to make sense of human communication which obscures the dynamic communication process in favor of
precise analysis of isolated parts of that process, will likely lead to
distorted conclusions.
The legal community is not alone in its sometimes incomplete
analysis of issues which involve mass communications processes and
effects. That loosely defined area of mass communications research
14. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 112, 785-86.

labeled "media effects,"' 15 has often been criticized for its pessimistic
view of audiences. Alternative theoretical approaches to media re-

search and analysis proceed on the assumption that receivers actively
and even aggressively select and interpret data. Uses and gratifications research,16 expectancy theory, 17 processes and effects, 8 learn-

ing and persuasion theory,' 9 attribution theory,20 and consistency
theory, 2 are only a few of the more well known social scientific or
quantitative approaches to communications research. In addition,
15. In many ways, the "media effects" tradition is a straw person within mass communications theory. It is difficult to conceive of any study of media which is not predicated upon
and interested in the impact of mass communication on societies, groups, and individuals.
Many of the criticisms of effects research challenge either the ecological validity (i.e., the
relationship of the research to the "real world," in laboratory research) or the internal validity
(i.e., the relationship of methodology to the explanation, in field research). The term is used
here only to note an emphasis by researchers on causation, de-emphasizing the more subtle
ways in which social, systemic, and individual processes interact with mediums and their content. Compare BAUER, The Obstinate Audience: The Influence Process from the Point of View
of Social Communication, THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION 326
(SCHRAMM & ROBERTS ed. 1971) (offering an early critique of the media effects tradition);
NOELLE-NEUMANN, The Effects of Media on Media Effects Research, 33 J. OF COMM. 157
(1983) (noting the effects of media attention on effects research and disputing the challenges
to the tradition). See also CHAFFEE, Mass Media Effects: New Research Perspectives, COMMUNICATION RESEARCH - A HALF-CENTURY APPRAISAL, 210 (LERNER & NELSON ed. 1972)
(noting the tendency of effects research to concentrate on individual-level content-specific attitudinal effects).
16. Compare BLUMLER, The Role of Theory in Uses and Gratifications Studies, 6
COMM. RESEARCH 9 (1979) (arguing that uses and gratifications research attempts to come to
grips with audience experience and explaining how particular motivations facilitate or decrease
media influence processes); SWANSON, Political Communication Research and the Uses and
Gratifications Model: A Critique, 6 COMM. RESEARCH 37 (1979) (urging conceptual analysis
rather than the ad hoc variable analytic method, and stressing the need for considering meaning and interpretation as fundamental to an "active audience" tenet). And compare McGUIRE,
Psychological Motives and Communication Gratification, THE USES OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON GRATIFICATION RESEARCH 167 (BLUMLER & KATZ ed.
1974).
17. See VANLEUVEN, Expectancy Theory in Media and Message Selection, 8 COMM.
RESEARCH 425 (1981) (attempting to construct a model for uses and gratifications research
which considers how user expectations determine and reinforce particular media selections).
18. See BECKER, Visual Stimuli and the Construction of Meaning, VISUAL LEARNING,
THINKING, AND COMMUNICATION 39 (RANDHAWA & COFFMAN ed. 1978) (presenting a mosaic
model of communication with special application for media).
19. See ATKIN Consumer and Social Effects of Advertising, PROGRESS IN COMMUNICATION SCIENCES 205 (DERVIN & VOIGHT ed. 1983) (considering the impact of cognitive
learning, affective levels, and behavioral enactment on the influence of specific media effects/
outcomes).
20. See SEIBOLD & SPITZBERG, Attribution Theory and Research: Review and Implications for Communication, PROGRESS IN COMMUNICATION SCIENCES 85 (DERVIN & VOIGHT
ed. 1983) (providing a review of the literature and basic assumptions). Attribution theory is of
particular importance for a consideration of the Bose cases. This theory basically posits "average persons" as active seekers of invariance. Thus, when they attribute a set of motives to a
communicator - such as a product review which does not account for their experiences, or is
viewed as an overt persuasive endeavor - audiences will adjust their inquiries and interpretations accordingly.
21. See DONOHEW & TIPTON, A Conceptual Model of Information Seeking, Avoiding,
and Processing, NEW MODELS FOR MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 243 (CLARKE ed. 1973)
(emphasizing the "steady state" theory of how individuals make choices and account for discrepancies among messages).

qualitative and "critical" researchers have reinstated the audience as
at least a theoretically powerful participant in the media experience. 22 Scholars who adopt these methodologies do not dispute the
power of media to influence and alter attitudes or behavior. They do,
however, retain a commitment to research which takes into account
the interpretive capacity of individuals and groups.
Law, and especially libel law, cannot adopt wholesale the disputed, often incomplete, and usually inconclusive theories of the social sciences. But neither can libel law disregard them or turn its
back on the fundamental insights these fields provide. This is especially so if libel law has employed approaches that respect the nature
of the mass communication process, but has begun to veer away
from them.
If the defamation torts are to sustain their purpose in providing
redress for reputational harm rather than for slipshod journalism or
media irresponsibility, the analytical frameworks that are now being
applied in the interest of free expression must be carefully assessed.
Privileges and standards of proof designed to allow for more precise
determinations of fault and falsity tend to isolate some variables in
the communication experience and to ignore others. When these isolated and specific issues are addressed and synthesized in the form of
a libel judgment, they often fail to explain the communication taken
as a whole. As our analysis of the Bose litigation indicates, such a
result is unsatisfying and unhelpful in providing guidelines for media
practitioners.
III.

Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
To them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the
shadows of the images.
-PlatoThe listener perceives the source of the sound not as either or
both of the two actual loudspeakers but as a "phantom" or
"apparent" source located somewhere between the two
loudspeakers.'s
-Judge Julian-

In 1970, Consumer Reports published a review of the Bose 901
loudspeaker system. The article included the following passage,
22. See FISKE & HARLETY, READING TELEVISION (1978); MORLEY, Texts, Readers,
Subjects, CULTURE. MEDIA, LANGUAGE 163 (1980); NIGHTINGALE, Media Audiences - Media Products? 2 AUsT. J. CULTURAL STUDIES 23 (1984); METZ, Aural Objects, 60 YALE
FRENCH STUDIES 24 (1980) (specifically discussing the ways in which sound is conceptualized
that make sense only for images).
23. Judge Julian made this statement in Bose 1, 508 F. Supp. at 1264.

which became decisive in the initial bench trial on the issue of
liability:
Worse, individual instruments heard through the Bose system
seemed to grow to gigantic proportions and tended to wander
about the room. For instance, a violin appeared to be 10 feet
wide, and a piano stretched from wall to wall. 4
Plaintiff Bose Corporation claimed that these statements, and the article taken as a whole, were false, misleading, and the cause of lost
sales.
The presiding trial court judge found the remark about wandering instruments to be false and disparaging.
Damages were
awarded in the second hearing on that issue only, 26 and the overall
result provoked a de novo review in the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit. 7 The appellate court reversed on the grounds that the
plaintiff had not proved actual malice through clear and convincing
evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, defining the scope of de novo
review as the primary issue.28 Both appellate courts avoided the most
troublesome question in the first hearing: that of actual falsity and
its relationship to other standards of proof in disparagement cases.
Product disparagement requires a plaintiff to allege and prove
actual falsity, disparagement, and special damages.2 9 Due to its status as a public figure, the Bose Corporation was also obliged to prove
actual malice - specifically, that relevant statements in the Consumer Reports article were made with knowledge of falsity or with
reckless disregard for truth or falsity at the time of publication.80
Because the hearing on damages was severed from that of liability,
the court in the first case addressed only questions of actual falsity,
disparagement, and actual malice, largely in that sequence. Each of
these questions generated meticulous analysis of some elements of
the communication process but overlooked others. It is to defining
and understanding the courts' analysis that we shall first turn, as a
prelude to an evaluation of that analysis in later sections.
A.

Actual Falsity
Actual falsity was the central issue in the original trial. The
24.
25.

CONSUMER REPORTS, at 274 (May 1970).
See Bose I, 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1269.

26. See Bose I1, 529 F. Supp. 357, 365.
27.

See Bose 11I, 692 F.2d 189, 195.

28. See Bose IV, 466 U.S. 485, 514.
29. See Bose 1, 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1268; Bose 11, 529 F. Supp. 357, 361; Dooling v.
Budget Publishing Co., 144 Mass. 258, 10 N.E. 809 (1887); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 623A, 633 (1976).
30. Bose I, 508 F. Supp., at 1274.

court examined five particular passages in the Consumer Reports review, and reached different conclusions about each. Some statements
31
were judged misleading but not technically false or disparaging.
Other passages contained false implications, 2 had not been proved
untrue by a preponderance of the evidence,33 or were simply statements of opinion." Only the statement which characterized the
sound source as a roaming one was judged to be sufficiently factual
and inaccurate to establish a claim of product disparagement against
Consumers Union, the parent company of Consumer Reports.
In public defamation cases, falsity is usually presumed by a well
pleaded complaint, and the defendant has the option of raising truth
as a defense. 35 This is not the case in product disparagement actions,
which are considered much narrower in scope than those concerning
personal reputation. 6 Product disparagement and defamation cases,
however, are treated alike in terms of constitutional privilege, and
therefore a public figure plaintiff, as the Bose Corporation was
deemed to be, must prove actual malice to succeed in a disparagement action,3 7 In a public disparagement case, then, both actual fal31. Id. at 1260-61 (finding use of words "panel" and "panelists" misleading but not
disparaging).
32. Id. at 1262 (finding that statements suggesting loudspeaker accuracy was determined objectively carried false implications but were not disparaging).
33. Id. at 1263-64 (stating that evidence on the issue of large power requirements was
contradictory, and not proved by plaintiff by a preponderance of evidence).
34. Id. at 1262 (statements regarding sound quality and accuracy deemed opinion, and
not susceptible to proof of truth or falsity).
35. In some jurisdictions, proof of falsity by the plaintiff has been constitutionally required, the usual theory being that the first amendment should foreclose liability based on
truth. See, e.g., Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371, 374-76 (6th Cir.
1981), cert. den'd, 454 U.S. 1130 (1981); Nevada Indep. Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen,_
Nev. -,
664 P.2d 337, 343 (1983); Dunlap v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 301 Pa.
Super. 475, 483-90, 448 A.2d 6, 11-14 (1982). Such a view, however, would have to be reconciled with the continued constitutionality of the public disclosure privacy tort. See Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489-90 (1975), and does not appear to represent the weight
of authority today. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968); Fendler v.
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 130 Ariz. 475, 478, 636 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Ariz. App. 1981); Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing and Printing, Ltd., 89 N.J. 451, 460, 446 A.2d 469, 473 (1982);
Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis.2d 636, 660-61 n.35, 318 N.W.2d 141, 153 n.35, cert. den'd, 459
U.S. 883 (1982). The United States Supreme Court is currently considering a case which may
turn on this issue.
While the general rule may therefore be characterized as involving a presumption of falsity arising from a well-pleaded complaint alleging defamation, a different and probably purer
reflection of the common law is that falsity is not an element at all. Rather, the tort is one for
damage to reputation, not falsity, and reputation is a protected interest even if not entirely
based on truth. Truth as a defense, therefore, does not operate to counteract an element of the
tort, but instead represents justification for a defamation. It is for this reason, in large measure, that literal truth need not be demonstrated. See W. PROSSER. THE LAW OF TORTS 797-99

(4th ed. 1971);

SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS

40, 129-42 (1980).

36. See Bose 1, 508 F. Supp. 1249, at 1270-71; Bose 11, 529 F. Supp. 357, at 361;
Note, Corporate Defamation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the Analog, to Personal Defamation, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 963, 980-81 (1975).
37. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Bose I, 508 F. Supp., at
1274.

sity and actual malice - the publisher's belief about probable falsity
at the time of publication 3 8 - must be proved. In most public defamation cases, only the latter showing needs to be made. Under constitutional privilege analysis, the falsity question considers only what
was or should have been determinable at the time of publication.
Actual falsity, however, may be determined after the fact, a circumstance which, in the Bose case, shifted judicial attention from what
Consumer Reports staffers knew or could have been expected to
know about their statements to scrutiny of specific words and
phrases in the article.
Based upon testimony, the demeanor of the author/reviewer,
and a custom-and-usage definition of the word "about," the judge in
the first trial decided that the statement concerning wandering instruments was false. More specifically, the court found that the described location of the movement of the apparent sound source was
inaccurate. 9 In order to fully articulate the problems of this type of
content based determination of actual falsity, it is helpful to trace
the logic of the first opinion, and to note assumptions about the communications process which encourage such an approach.
While acknowledging movement between loudspeakers as a
common effect anticipated by readers of product testing and review
periodicals, the court very narrowly defined the acceptable limits of
such movement, and, hence, descriptions of it. Sound travel "along
the wall" would not be surprising, the court stated, but movement
throughout other areas of the room would be bizarre, unexpected,
and objectionable. 0 The court assumed that most reader/listeners
would not expect this latter phenomenon, and would make purchasing decisions on unfounded expectations of anomalous aural effects.
Actual falsity thus involved, according to the court, deference to custom and usage of technical terminology among ordinary consumers.
Yet the resolution of the actual falsity issue turned on the court's
determination of the marginal difference between the actual meanings of the two phrases "along the wall" and "about the room."
Even more rigorous content based criteria were used to determine whether the comment about individual instruments wandering
"about the room" was false. The phrase which located this movement "about" the room generated detailed analysis of the word
"about" both in and out of the article's context. The court first found
that the average interpretation of the word "about" would be
38. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); St.
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968); SACK, supra note 3, at 129-46; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 613 (1965).
39. See Bose 1, 508 F. Supp., at 1267.
40. Id.

"around."'" Testimony by Consumer Reports personnel was used to
support this definition. Because the first draft of the review contained the phrase "around the room," the so-called "plain, ordinary
meaning" posited by the court was considered substantiated.4 2 The
syntactic and semantic discrepancies between first and final drafts
served double duty in the liability hearing. Not only did they establish a second justification for a claim of actual falsity in the judge's
view, but these discrepancies also recurred in consideration of actual
malice. It is crucial to note that nothing in the initial opinion indicates that evidence was supplied to show whether an average reader
would attach a high level of significance to either word choice - i.e.,
"about the room" rather than "along the wall" - or to the difference between them. Words were thus endowed with extratextual
meaning, both in defining the statement's meaning, and in judging
the falsity of that meaning.
Perhaps the most puzzling "proof" of actual falsity was the absence in consumer responses or other reviews of observations similar
to those made by Consumer Reports. The court suggested that had
the Bose 901 system in fact produced the unique auditory phenomena attributed to it in the article, actual purchasers would have complained.4 3 Yet none had done so. This instance of negative proof
might have been viewed as evidence that consumers did not find the
audio effects bothersome, that readers interpreted the statement differently than did the court, or that readers may have had different
expectations regarding an experimental loudspeaker system than
those anticipated by trial participants. The court did not discuss
these possibilities, but instead reasoned that no consumer complaints
meant no wandering effects, thus reinforcing a finding of actual
falsity.
In support of this logical maneuver, the court cited one review
of Bose 901 speakers that appeared to contradict the offending statements. 4 This fourth and final proof again partially based a claim of
actual falsity on the specific wording of an article which described
the Bose 901 sound effects differently from the Consumer Reports
review. One statement thus sufficed to provide evidence of actual falsity. The minute disparity between the import of a claim that sound
sources tended to "wander about the room" and one that localized
movement "along the wall" established a threshold for actual falsity.
41. Id. at 1268.
42. Id.
43. id.
44. Id. (quoting from a review published in Stereo & HiFi Times which was introduced as evidence by Bose). See text accompanying note 70 infra for the text of the review.

Denotative meanings, if such truly exist,45 were determined out of
context, and then generalized and treated as the product of a more
complex connotative analysis; that is, consideration of the range of
meanings possible within that particular text and the disparaging
power of those meanings. The court's analysis emphasized, to the
virtual exclusion of all else, the textual power of words themselves.
This mode of analysis also dominated adjudication of the actual malice question, which yielded different, although equally troubling,
consequences.
B.

Actual Malice

Actual malice takes no account of reader or audience interpretations, but concentrates on the intent and knowledge of the speaker,
or, in the Bose case, of those involved in the reporting and editing
process. The trial court correctly noted the importance of the
writer's state of mind at the time of publication in its determination
of actual malice, and focused on linguistic discrepancies in reaching
its decision. Because the author had originally used the phrase
"around the room" to describe the wandering effect, because his testimony attempted to equate this effect with that of movement "along
the wall," and because these two descriptions were not coterminous,
the court held that actual malice had been shown.
According to the court, the writer could not have reasonably
interpreted the phrase in question to mean anything other than its
"plain, ordinary meaning."" This conclusion depended more upon a
hard distinction between the meanings of words than on an inquiry
into the publishers' knowledge about the impact of such a distinction. Although the author of the article testified that either statement about sound movement adequately described his phenomenology of the Base 901 effects, the court doubted his credibility.47 This
judgment was largely, if not entirely, based upon the conclusion that
no sensible audio expert would think that sounds moving along a
wall could be truthfully characterized as moving about the room.
The actual malice inquiry is more justifiably reliant on the textual power of specific words, and the reflection of those words of the
writer's state of mind, not the audience's interpretation. Actual malice, in short, is not a communication inquiry. Yet actual malice is an
45. See Eco, supra note 11, at 56-57 (noting the difference between denotation and
connotation as a coding convention, not an intrinsic distinction); MOORE, supra note 9, at 181202 (pointing out problems of language known in linguistic theory as "multivocality"), 168170 (discussing denotation and connotation as popularized parallels to extensional and intensional aspects of the referential theory of meaning).
46. Bose I, 508 F. Supp. 1249, at 1276-77.
47. Id. at 1277.

inquiry into the communicator's state of mind, or subjective knowledge and belief. As such, the textual content of words should not be
determinative, especially if the range of possible meanings of the text
is broad, and, consequently, the communicator's subjective intention
cannot be reasonably governed by a single meaning of the text. The
court's judgment about credibility, surely a central element of actual
malice, appears to have been based not only on demeanor, consistency of testimony, and the like, but also on the ground that the
publisher's intended meaning was not credible because it departed
from the meaning ascribed to the text by the court. 48 If, as will be
discussed later, the text is inherently subject to various reasonable
constructions, the court's focus on the textual power of the words
alone was improper.
The Bose court's textual orientation seems to have been influenced by the actual falsity question. Without the rigid threshold established by the court on the actual falsity issue, actual malice
would surely have been much more difficult to prove. By focusing on
one specific meaning of the text, the prior resolution of the actual
falsity issue clearly operated to the defendant's disadvantage in the
consideration of actual malice.
C. Disparagement and Damages

In contrast with extensive analysis of the truth/falsity problem,
disparagement occupied little of the court's attention. The judge
flatly stated that the controversial remarks "could have no effect
other than to harm the reputation of the product."4 Though the
opinion refers to testimony concerning dealer and consumer complaints about two remarks - the "wandering instruments" comment
and the comment concerning gigantic power requirements - it is
unclear how these complaints constituted proof of disparagement.
The court failed to articulate the exact significance of the limited
testimony to the resolution of the issue of disparagement, the quality
and weight of the testimony, and its relevance to the question of interpretation by readers and prospective buyers of the speakers, as
opposed to existing owners. Instead, the judge based the finding of
disparagement on the ground that "[a] statement that attributes
48. The court explained its conclusion that the statements "about the room" and
"along the wall" could not credibly be viewed by the writer as synonymous in the following
passage:
Seligson is an intelligent person whose knowledge of the English language cannot be questioned. It is simply impossible for the Court to believe that he interprets a commonplace word such as "about" to mean anything other than its
plain, ordinary meaning.
Bose I, 508 F. Supp., at 1277.
49.

Id. at 1268.

such grotesque qualities as instruments wandering about the room
could have no effect other than to harm the reputation of the product."5 0 The disparagement issue, like that of actual falsity, was resolved with audience interpretation in mind. Nevertheless, injury to
the reputation of the Bose 901 speakers was considered the result of
the communicative power of the content of the Consumer Reports
article, regardless of any intervening reader interpretations.
The liability hearing thus set the perimeters for analysis in subsequent proceedings. Meanings of isolated phrases were taken as
facts in some instances, but as implications or opinions in others.
Actual malice was largely determined by assuming that the alleged
factual, a priori meanings were known and flouted. Terminology of
the review was found disparaging by linguistic fiat. The first Bose
court continually referred to "reasonable readers," "average readers," and "average listeners," and assumed their responses to specific
content, but did not request verification for them. Nor would such a
request be compelled under contemporary defamation or disparagement analysis.
One might have expected the proof of negative reader response
to emerge in the hearing on damages. Product disparagement is a
narrow cause of action in terms of damages, and exists to "provide
redress only for tangible and direct pecuniary loss, a purely economic injury ... ."' To meet its burden of proof on special damages, plaintiff Bose had to argue that the Consumer Reports review
was a substantial cause of lost Bose 901 sales. In order to do so, Bose
offered as evidence the difference between its projected sales, which
were in turn based on extrapolation of actual sales for the previous
year, and the percentage of sales made during the eight month period following publication of the article.52
Damages, interest, and costs in the amount of $210,905.64 were
awarded by the second court. Two causal links between the content
of the article and the decline in sales were presented to justify the
award. First, the original Bose opinion was cited, in which the court
posited the relative importance of Consumer Reports to potential
consumer decisions.58 Second, assuming that the publication was
largely responsible for the Bose 901 reputation, a "direct relationship" between this reputation and product sales was claimed by the
50. Bose 1, 508 F. Supp. at 1268.
51. See Bose II, 529 F. Supp. 357, at 361; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 633,
comment h (1976). When widely disseminated, recovery for loss of market may be proved by
circumstantial evidence showing first, that the loss in fact occurred, and second, by eliminating
other causes for such loss.
52. Bose II 529 F. Supp. at 364.
53. Id. at 363, citing Bose I, 508 F. Supp. 1249, at 1252.

plaintiff.54 Although these elements of causation were plausible theoretically, they were, again, founded on unsubstantiated, if not dubious, notions about the influence of media content upon readers, listeners, and consumers.
Appellate review of the Bose case did little to remedy these analytical deficiencies. Addressing only the issue of liability, the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court upon de novo review. The reviewing court summarized its findings as follows:
The evidence presented merely shows that the words in the article may not have described what the two panelists heard . . .
CU [Consumer Reports] was guilty of using imprecise language
• .. Certainly
this does not support an inference of actual
65
malice.
The factual finding under scrutiny was that of actual malice, i.e., the
subjective state of mind of the defendant on the question of falsity.
Whether or not the scope of de novo review could include questions
of material or actual falsity remains uncertain, and the Supreme
Court did not offer guidance in its affirmation of the appellate court
decision.'
IV.

Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union as Communication Theory

Scrupulous concern with appropriate constitutional privilege
analysis led the Bose courts to center on two components of the communication process in the disparagement setting: the content of the
text of the publication, and the subjective knowledge of Consumer
Reports personnel. In addition, the written opinions illustrated a
confusing approach to proving fault and falsity under the rubic of
fact, as opposed to opinion or implication.
Falsity was based on the misuse of objective terms and the supplied evidence of fault. Actual malice, the constitutional standard of
liability in cases involving public figure plaintiffs, was satisfied by the
mere appearance of the "factually" false statements, and the lack of
credibility that followed from an interpretation departing from the
assigned "factual" meaning. The boundary between fact, on the one
hand, and opinion or implication, on the other, was implicitly assumed but never explained.
A protracted period of discovery,'57 a nineteen day bench trial on
the liability issue,' 8 and a lengthy discussion of the "facts" in the
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54. Id. at 363.
55. Bose !II, 692 F.2d 189, at 197.
56. See Bezanson, Fault, Falsity and Reputation in Public Defamation Law, 8 HAML. REV. 105, 114-119 (1985).
57. See Bose 1, 508 F. Supp. 1249, at 1251.
58. Id.

initial opinion manifest the fact that determinations of truth vs. falsity and fact vs. opinion were extremely complicated in this case,
simply because human interpretive process were involved. These
complications were exacerbated when processes and products of
communication seemed virtually indistinguishable, as they tend to be
in mass media experiences.
The Bose case was a media case. The product involved was a
loudspeaker system that reproduced re-recorded sounds which, in
turn, had to be perceived and processed by individual listeners. Consumer Reports is a product of the mass media which conveys descriptive and evaluative information through linguistic and photographic formats. This information must also be perceived and
processed by individual readers, who may or may not be sophisticated listeners or knowledgeable about audio technology.
It is by now commonplace within media theory that audiences,
whether readers or listeners, play active roles in even the least interactive media. The audience has also been an important element in
common law defamation, because it is the audience, or interpretive
community, which is the site of reputational harm. If no one interprets communicative material as defamatory or disparaging, no
harm exists, despite the falsity of that material. Any thorough understanding of the significance of the Bose cases requires persistent
consideration of audience response - a consideration absent in the
bench trials on factual issues.
Let us examine the analysis of the first court on the issues of
falsity and fault, and observe how constitutional privileges obscured
the role of reader/listeners. The conclusion that the plaintiff had established a claim of product disparagement against Consumers
Union derived from a single statement which attempted to verbalize
the listening experience of product testing and rating experts. It is
important to recall that this and other statements in the article relied
on visual imagery in the linguistic reformulation of aural perceptions. The court noted this and other terminological confusions, attributing them to the fact that "there are no consistent widely accepted terms used to describe this phenomenon." 5 9 Despite this
handicap, the trial court insisted on determining the so-called actual
meanings of words in the article.
The decisive phrase was that which described the perceived tendency of instruments to "wander about the room." More specifically,
the preposition "about" became the basis for the meaning of the
statement, both for its falsity, and for the conclusion that the remark
was made with knowledge of its falsity. According to the court, the
59.

Bose I, 508 F. Supp. 1249, at 1264-65.

word "about" in this context was identical with the plain, ordinary
meaning of the word "around," the preposition used in the reviewer's
first draft which was subsequently altered. Knowledge that the edited and published version contained an inaccurate rendering of
sound movement was inferred from the alteration itself.
In contrast with the plain ordinary meaning of the word
"about," was the writer's testimony that defined the phrase "about
the room" to mean "along the wall." Because the writer was an intelligent person whose knowledge of English would render this interpretation absurd, the statement was judged to be knowingly false,
notwithstanding both the writer's contrary testimony, and the fact
that it was not the word itself, but a sensory phenomenon, that was
at issue. Apparently, the semantic discrepancy between what the
writer claimed to mean and the meaning which the populace in general would infer from the phrase constituted actual falsity.
At this point, it may be helpful to provide possible reader interpretations for the objectionable phrases, and to note the rather broad
range of images that the words conjure. Sometimes, visual imagery
may result. Sometimes, aural perceptions are merely conceptualized
in and anchored by visual metaphors, and do not necessarily generate mental pictures. If one tries to picture a violin ten feet wide and
a wall-to-wall piano producing sounds which tend to "wander about
the room," what imagery would make sense of these comments? Perhaps one imagines not a visual representation of enlarged instruments, but rather recognizes the words as metaphors for enhanced
sound, i.e., increased volume, brighter tones, and the like. Possibly,
the wandering effect is not one in which instruments are visualized
as moving, but instead one in which different instruments occupy different spaces within the envisioned acoustical environment. A more
complicated interpretation would conceive these different spaces or
pockets of sound as changing position as well.
None of these potential imaging activities seem more or less
likely than the others, nor do they appear necessarily undesirable in
a unique audio system. None of them seem intuitively likely to represent a unanimous or predominant interpretation of readers, whose
range of tastes and experiences (which they bring to their interpretation) may include, for example, opera, orchestra, hard rock, and
country and western music. More significantly, categories such as
truth, falsity, fact, and opinion are of little use in determining the
meaning of such descriptive statements without recognizing the capacity of readers to attribute meanings along a continuum and according to their own expectations and experiences. The possibility for
alternative reader interpretations evidently did not occur to any of

the parties in the liability hearing.
The reasoning of the trial court seems to be as follows: a) Consumer Reports writers knew that the Bose 901 speakers reproduced
sounds which tended to, at worst, move "along the wall;" b) These
writers knew that the phrase "about the room" did not mean "along
the wall," and that the former phrase was an inaccurate description
of the aural phenomena; c) Ordinary readers would interpret the
phrase negatively, as a "grotesque" quality which disparaged the
product; d) Ordinary readers would not interpret the words in the
way in which the reviewers claimed to have intended them; and, e)
The disparity constituted a factual error, and rendered the specific
statement false. This hypothetical chain of analysis demonstrates the
intense scrutiny of communicator intent, and its relationship to media message content, which results from the actual malice inquiry.
Yet such analysis overlooks the ambiguities of language and the special problems of technical writing.
Early in the opinion, the Bose 901 system was identified as
unique and unconventional. Nevertheless, in making its determinations, the court applied a plain meaning test to the writer's words,
and attempted to decide how a reasonable reader might "naturally"
construe such words.6 0 In short, conventional terms should have been
used to convey information about a decidedly unconventional loudspeaker system, and these terms should have been accurate. Although statements about Bose 901 sound quality and accuracy were
deemed subjective matters not susceptible to proof of truth or falsity,6 1 those concerning size and movement were alleged factual errors - made by experts whose influence upon potential consumers
was substantial.
This approach suggests that those with greater degrees of technical knowledge are held to higher standards of verbal acuity. At the
same time, the "actual" meanings of words and phrases are to be
determined according to ordinary reader criteria, if indeed such assumptions about audience literacy levels could be justified. However,
while Consumer Reports readers were theoretically crucial for decisions about factuality and falsity, no evidence was presented to show
62
that these readers formed a significant portion of the Bose market.
1 The importance of readers as
interpreters is undeniable, yet the
trial courts engaged in analysis of complex communicative processes
and effects based on questionable assumptions about those readers.
First, readers and listeners were presumed to be identical. Those who
60. Id. at 1265. Any attempt to claim that one particular interpretation of a word is
"natural" would be unacceptable to most language theorists.
61. Id. at 1262-63.
62. See Bose 1, 508 F. Supp., at 1252.

read the offending article were supposedly the same listeners who did
not purchase the Bose 901 system. Second, readers were arguably
conceptualized as tabula rasa interpreters who made consumer decisions as a result of the literal meanings of the article's words. Third,
it was presumed that the readers did not compare the actual words
of the review with their own listening preferences and experiences,
which might have led them to investigate the Bose 901 system because of its novelty. Fourth, the court assumed that the statements
regarding size and movement of instruments would be interpreted as
authoritative facts, while similar comments about quality and accuracy would be considered opinions and thus constitutionally
protected.
Given these assumptions, it becomes possible to comprehend not
only the trial court decisions, but also the rather outraged appellate
responses to it. Indeed, the Supreme Court seems to have perceived
the root problems in the Bose case, although it based its decision on
other grounds. Referring explicitly to the trial court's reliance on the
text, the Court stated:
'Analysis of this kind may be adequate when the alleged libel
purports to be an eyewitness or other direct account of events
that speak for themselves'

. .

. Here, however, adoption of the

language chosen was 'one of a number of possible rational interpretations' of an event 'that bristled with ambiguities and descriptive challenges for the writer.'63

The fact that the Bose approach is neither isolated nor surprising in
view of the emphasis currently placed on the issues of fact, falsity,
and subjective intent,6 suggests a need to reexamine legal approaches to a body of tort law which has communication at its core,
when these approaches omit perhaps the most crucial element of the
communication process.
The four cases known collectively as Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union manifest a number of problems which inhere in contemporary public defamation. First, they indicate the extent to
which our narrowing focus on fact, falsity and intent, precludes significant inquiry into communication processes and effects, particularly within mass media contexts. Second, this focus in turn generates increasing disregard for relational aspects of defamation actions
by focusing analysis primarily on communicator intent or knowledge
and specific message content. The concept of defamation as a tort
which protects reputational interests within relevant interpretive
63. See Bose IV, 466 U.S. 485, 512 (emphasis in original).
64. See, e.g., Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984); BEZANSON, Libel Law
and the Press: Setting the Record Straight, 71 IowA L. REV. 226 (1985).

communities loses force when those communities, or audiences, are
not recognized as active interpreters. Finally, and more generally,
the Bose quartet illustrates the inability of language authoritatively
to describe perceptual and conceptual phenomena. At the root of
these problems lies an inadequate epistemology of human perception
which is exemplified in the Bose litigation.
V.

The Bose Case Reconsidered

The underlying claim in the Bose case was that a media artifact, the Consumer Reports product review of the Bose 901 loudspeaker system, had a direct effect upon the reputation of that system. Less obviously, the claim was based on a theory about the
relationship between perception and imagery. The panelists who
tested and evaluated Bose 901 performance translated their own sensory experiences into language which used visual metaphors to describe aural phenomena. Current research into the mental process
called "imaging" suggests that images or mental pictures are actively constructed by individuals, and that these images often resemble representations formed during perception. 65 More importantly,
visual and auditory images may selectively interfere with visual and
aural perceptions." Properties of the medium used in representation
6
also affect the correspondences between perception and imagery. 7
In the Consumer Reports article, language was the primary vehicle for conveying information. Language has the unique properties
of double articulation and multivocality, which can best be explained
through example. When the writers discussed the ability of the Bose
901 system to make a violin seem ten feet wide, the word "violin"
generated different images for different individuals. Hence, there is a
double articulation; specifically, that of the specific word and its subsequent articulation by the interpreter. There is also multivocality in
that the term "violin" has more than one sense. That is, the sense
intended is not necessarily made clear in the context of the sentence. 66 Readers may think that the word refers not to an actual
violin producing the sounds, (i.e., the sound source), but rather refers
to the category of violin sounds themselves, or to the physical aural
spaces they occupy. The image of the instrument or the sense of the
noun would be constructed by the reader, invited but not compelled
by the writer's prose. This construction would be less flexible had it
65. See BISIACH & LUZZATTI, supra note 8.
66. See SErGAL & FUSELLA, supra note 8.
67. See KOSSLYN, supra note 8, at 46.
68. See Bose 1, 508 F. Supp. 1249, at 1264 n.29 (listing all the possible terms for
"sound source" and the confusion which resulted from not having one term that could account
for the aural phenomenon to which it referred).

been accompanied by a visual representation, such as a photograph
- an unlikely occurrence in the Bose review, yet one which has led
to rejection of theories that try to compare audio/visual systems of
representation to language. The point here is that the aural imagery
of readers cannot be predicted solely with reference to the vocabulary of the review.
A second issue that pervades the first court's opinion involves
the notion of fidelity. The court assumes, and the plaintiff surely concurs, that what potential purchasers expect in a loudspeaker system
is high fidelity: an overall sound which would make one feel as if one
were seated in a concert hall, and were hearing the performance in
person; a sound which most nearly corresponds to the acoustic reality
it represents. Given the unconventional and experimental nature of
the Bose 901 system, this view of fidelity or realistic representation
appears inappropriate. It ignores the fact that most sound recordings
undergo extensive mixing in the studio in order to enhance certain
aural effects, to reduce distortion and noise, and to "place" instruments on particular soundtracks. When these re-recorded sounds are
played back (the function of the consumer's total audio system) the
question of fidelity must be modified to ask the following: fidelity to
what? The difficulty in resolving the ambiguity of language in the
article is increased by the difficulty in finding referents for the "aural objects" to which the words refer.6 9
When the court in the liability hearing compared the Consumer
Reports article to one published in Stereo & HiFi Times, it noted
the conflict between the former, which characterized the sound
source as wandering "about the room," and the latter, which contained the following observation:
A stereo pair fills the wall with stereo, yet each instrument
has its prescribed space - and it stays there .... 70
This passage was cited to support the assertion that sound movement
"along the wall" was an accurate depiction of the Bose 901 effects. 1
However, the court failed to notice that allotment of "space" to instruments does not contradict a general assessment of sound as
"wandering." Neither review surmounts the ambiguities of language,
especially when that language depends heavily on visual imagery to
portray audio effects.
It would be difficult under the best of circumstances to recreate
69. See METZ, supra note 22.
70. See Bose I, 508 F. Supp. 1249 at 1268.
71. Id. at 1267-68.

aural phenomena for readers, lay or professional. It would be even
more hazardous to presume that consumers interested in the Bose
901 system would rely only on such verbalizations when making
purchasing decisions. Most consumer protection publications urge
potential buyers to try out the product and to determine its value for
their special needs. Had readers investigated the product in question,
their own perceptual processes would probably override the imprecise aural imagery suggested by Consumer Reports. An image labeled "grotesque" by a trial judge might appeal to some readers,
whether or not it matches that person's own phenomenology of the
perceptual experience.
The Bose case offers a number of challenges to scholars who
urge change in current approaches to the defamation tort. The lesson
of the case is not that statements about perceptual and conceptual
processes which are highly ambiguous and metaphorical can never
be actionable. Rather, one must be wary of attempting to resolve
such difficulties without regard for a substantial force in any communication situation - the interpreter or interpretive community.
Additionally, the Bose case renders unhelpful trivial distinctions
between fact and opinion, and truth and falsity. To set a threshold of
fact (and hence demonstrable truth) somewhere between a phrase
characterizing sound as wandering "along the wall" and one which
located the movement "about the room" seems arbitrary and
counterproductive. The need for Consumer Reports to convey extremely technical information in understandable terms for a diverse
audience requires, even makes inevitable, some sacrifice of precision.
The aesthetic aspect of audio phenomena must also be taken into
account. If the difference between acceptable and actionable statements rests upon misuse of adverbial phrases, it is hard to see how
any film, book, or other review of media artifacts would survive libel
litigation.
VI.

Conclusion

What does this analysis suggest be done with libel law? Our
first suggestion is that we keep a clear eye on the reputational foundation of the tort, recognizing at the same time that the question of
falsity and harm is in large measure dependent on the reader's or
viewer's perception. Our interest in placing limits on the tort in
terms of falsity, in other words, should lead us toward the audience's
interpretation, not away from it. Our second suggestion is that the
issues of fact versus opinion and of publisher state of mind - both
of which are products of constitutional doctrine, not of the common
law - are shadows. Opinion, as it is employed today, is simply a

description of audience interpretation. It cannot be meaningfully employed as a question of law to be decided by the content of the
words, the purpose of the speaker, and the general context of publication, independent of the specific setting and interpretation of the
audience. Unless kept entirely separate from the underlying tort,
state of mind can also be and often is a shadow. It can too easily
assume untoward proportion on the issues of disparagement and
harm, permitting the fact finder to judge liability for reputational
harm exclusively through the content-bound and speaker-oriented issue of publisher state of mind.
Our third suggestion pertains to the perceived need to place legal, as opposed to factual, limits on the scope of the libel action in
order to serve constitutional interests in expression. To do this, we
should draw those lines in ways that more accurately reflect the
communication process than do distinctions between fact and opinion
or falsity and truth. These terms are either unworkable or highly
artificial as the Bose case illustrates. The problem in the Bose case
does not concern these distinctions. Instead, the problem in Bose involves the difficulty of conveying by words, in a technically accurate
way, visual images and aesthetic judgments. We might be better off
to draw lines of privilege in such terms: where the form of expression
involves the representation in another medium 72 of essentially individual aesthetic or value-based judgments, libel should not lie. This
is not, however, because such expression cannot be libelous, for it
can. Notwithstanding this, we might conclude that the probable interpretive process will be so idiosyncratic that our knowledge and
experience counsel against any assumption that the harm can be adequately linked to the words or images employed by the publisher.
A legal framework which does not encourage, and at times does
not permit, inquiry into the actual interpretations and responses of a
reputational community endangers the very concept of reputation
and the validity of a body of law designed to protect it. We must
take care not to bask, like Plato's cave dwellers, in the shadows of
images to which we have become accustomed. To acknowledge the
participant/receiver in the negotiation of meaning within a defamation context is only to restate a truism in mass communication theory: that it is less important what a speaker intends than what a
72. One might, of course, argue that any representation involves another medium. The
point we make here is that defamation actions, which concern reputational injury resulting
from representations, require some recourse to referential theories of meaning. At common
law, plaintiffs have traditionally had to show that allegedly harmful published material could
reasonably be interpreted as referring to them. The greater the number of mediums involved in
the translation of experience into published material, the more courts should exercise caution
in considerations of audience interpretation.

listener hears. Surely, this demonstrates an epistemology of perception and reception which even Plato would approve.

